The proposed modifications to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in the Rules Committee Print 118-52—part of the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 5009 (the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025)—address two critical issues facing our military and society. These amendments aim to close dangerous loopholes in military law, reinforcing national security and protecting vulnerable individuals. They underscore the essential accountability, integrity, and justice principles that must define the armed forces and our legal system.
The Expansion of Article 103b: Combatting Betrayal of National Security
For decades, Article 103b of the UCMJ has narrowly defined “aiding the enemy” as providing intelligence, harboring adversaries, or supplying weapons. However, modern warfare extends beyond traditional definitions of treason. The battlefield has evolved, and betrayal now occurs through subtler yet equally dangerous channels. This proposed amendment broadens the definition to include “providing military education, military training, or tactical advice” to the enemy.
This change responds to reports of former U.S. special forces personnel offering their expertise to foreign militaries and private military contractors with questionable allegiances. These individuals may not be handing over physical weapons, but they are equipping adversaries with something equally potent—knowledge of American military tactics and strategies. Once imparted, this knowledge cannot be undone. It has the potential to compromise American operations, empower adversaries, and endanger the lives of U.S. service members.
Imagine a retired Green Beret hired by an adversarial foreign military. The training and tactical advice provided could enhance that nation’s combat effectiveness against U.S. interests. These scenarios are no longer hypothetical—they are happening now. Nations and organizations seek to leverage the skills that make the U.S. military formidable. Without regulations, American expertise could be weaponized against America itself.
This amendment ensures that former military personnel cannot trade patriotism for profit by training adversaries. It reinforces that those entrusted with the nation’s most sensitive knowledge must wield it responsibly, even after leaving active service. Careers in private military contracting, security consulting, or tactical training for foreign forces now face tighter scrutiny, ensuring that personal gain does not compromise national security.
The proposed changes to Article 103b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) within the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 are crucial in addressing the growing threat posed by black budget programs and the private military-industrial complex. For years, well-funded private intelligence corporations have lured away elite government personnel—intelligence officers, special forces operators, analysts, and strategists. Often established by former Intelligence Community persons, generals, and admirals, these organizations exploit skills and knowledge acquired through government service. They leverage clearances and access to classified methodologies to offer services globally, blurring the line between national interests and personal profit.
Companies such as The Analysis Corporation, Global Strategies Group, and Stanley, Inc. exemplify how private military contracting can dangerously blur the lines between legitimate defense support and sophisticated mercenary operations. These firms, often established and led by former high-ranking military officials—including generals and admirals—capitalize on their prior government roles, leveraging existing security clearances and insider knowledge to secure contracts abroad. Operating in volatile regions like Yemen, Turkey, and Afghanistan, they frequently engage in dual roles: fulfilling contracts for the U.S. government while simultaneously selling their influence and expertise to local governments, thereby gaining preferential treatment.
This dual engagement raises significant concerns about the integrity of U.S. military methods and the loyalty of those entrusted with national security. The commodification of military expertise risks sensitive information falling into the wrong hands and undermines the ethical foundations of military service.
The proposed amendment to Article 103b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) seeks to address these issues by expanding the definition of “aiding the enemy” to provide military education, training, or tactical advice to foreign entities. This change aims to preserve the sanctity of U.S. Army knowledge and ensure that those who have served remain committed to national interests rather than exploiting their expertise for personal gain in the global marketplace.
The intersection of former high-ranking U.S. military and intelligence officials with private defense and intelligence firms raises significant concerns about the potential commodification of sensitive national security expertise. A notable example is John O. Brennan, who served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2013 to 2017 and joined WestExec Advisors as a Principal in April 2022.
Aside from T.A.C. and Global Security Group (based in Luxembourg) in the past when he was back stateside after being Station Chief in the Middle East and having done some work in China, his newest venture joining WestExec is essential. WestExec Advisors is a boutique mercenary intelligence kabash and based strategic advisory firm that provides geopolitical risk analysis and consulting services to various clients, including defense sector clients. While the firm emphasizes its commitment to ethical practices, Brennan’s transition from a leading intelligence role to advising private entities highlights the complex dynamics of former officials navigating between public service and private enterprise.
Paragon Solutions exemplifies the troubling intersection of former intelligence officials, private surveillance companies, and foreign interests. Although the Tel Aviv-based smartphone surveillance startup operates in stealth mode with no public website, its presence is significant, with over 50 employees listed on LinkedIn. The company’s leadership raises serious concerns: Ehud Schneorson, the former commander of Unit 8200—Israel’s equivalent of the NSA—is a co-founder, director, and chief shareholder. Other co-founders, including CEO Idan Nurick, CTO Igor Bogudlov, and Vice President of Research Liad Avraham, all have backgrounds in Israeli intelligence. Adding weight to Paragon’s influence is former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who sits on the board of directors.
Paragon’s significant connection to American investors makes this situation even more troubling. Battery Ventures, a Boston-based venture capital firm, reportedly invested between $5 million and $10 million into Paragon. This blend of foreign intelligence expertise and American financial backing is concerning enough, but Paragon’s surveillance capabilities push it into dangerous territory. The company claims to have developed tools capable of remotely accessing encrypted messaging platforms like WhatsApp, Signal, Facebook Messenger, and Gmail. It also promises persistent access to devices, even after a reboot, which mirrors the controversial capabilities of Pegasus spyware.
Adding another layer to this issue is the involvement of John Brennan, the former Director of the CIA, and others associated with WestExec Advisors. WestExec, a strategic advisory firm, has facilitated partnerships and consulting arrangements with companies like Paragon, effectively bridging the gap between U.S. intelligence expertise and foreign surveillance interests. This relationship raises alarms about the potential compromise of national security and the ethical implications of former American intelligence officials enabling foreign surveillance capabilities.
The problem lies not only in the technology itself but also in the willingness of former high-ranking U.S. officials to participate in ventures that blur the lines between national loyalty and private profit. When American-backed firms and ex-officials collaborate with foreign intelligence startups, they risk exposing sensitive methodologies and weakening the security of U.S. communications infrastructure. Paragon’s operations—and similar ventures—underscore the urgent need for tighter regulations prohibiting former intelligence and military officials from working with foreign surveillance entities. These relationships threaten U.S. sovereignty, security, and ethical governance even when framed as business ventures.
Similarly, after serving as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Advisor, General Michael Flynn engaged with OSY Technologies, the parent company of the Israeli cyber intelligence firm NSO Group. Financial disclosures reveal that between 2015 and 2017, Flynn was allegedly compensated approximately $100,000 as a consultant and advisory board member for OSY Technologies and its then-owner, Francisco Partners.
It is not a matter of questioning the loyalty or integrity of individuals who have served the country honorably; instead, it is about eliminating the opportunity for exploitation.
Figures like General Michael Flynn have demonstrated unwavering support for the United States, and military and intelligence professionals establishing military-corporate (MC) firms or consulting with foreign entities have been normalized until now. However, this normalization poses a significant risk. Even the most patriotic intentions cannot mitigate the potential for strategic methods, classified expertise, and national intelligence to fall into the wrong hands.
Examples of “wrong hands” are General Michael Hayden, General Stanley McChrystal, and General James Jones, who served as National Security Advisor to President Obama, illustrating the prevalence of this issue. These individuals have founded or led companies that provide strategic services abroad, leveraging knowledge gained in service to the U.S. government. This practice needs to be curtailed immediately. The risk to national security is too significant, and the sanctity of military and intelligence methods must remain inviolable. In this context, the intersection of public service and private enterprise creates a dangerous loophole that can—and often does—undermine the security these individuals once swore to protect.
The Israeli company NSO Group and its Pegasus spyware have posed a significant threat to U.S. national security, global privacy, and human rights. This sophisticated surveillance tool has been at the center of numerous controversies due to its misuse by governments and entities worldwide. Pegasus is a highly advanced hacking tool capable of infiltrating smartphones without any action from the target. Once installed, it grants near-total control over the device, allowing operators to access messages, emails, call logs, and GPS locations and remotely activate microphones and cameras. This level of access enables extensive surveillance, potentially compromising sensitive information and communications.
Despite NSO Group’s claims that Pegasus is intended solely for counterterrorism and criminal investigations, evidence shows widespread misuse. Journalists, human rights activists, and political dissidents have been targeted, as well as government officials, including U.S. diplomats. Notably, family members of the murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi were reportedly surveilled. The Pegasus Project, a collaborative investigation by multiple news organizations, revealed a list of over 50,000 phone numbers potentially targeted by NSO Group clients, underscoring the scale and severity of the issue.
The misuse of Pegasus against U.S. interests is particularly concerning. At least 11 U.S. diplomats had their iPhones hacked while working abroad, and spyware was found on the devices of State Department officials involved in Uganda-related matters. These incidents demonstrate the potential for foreign entities to infiltrate sensitive U.S. government communications, posing a direct threat to national security.
In response to these threats, the U.S. government has taken decisive action. In November 2021, the Commerce Department added NSO Group to its trade blacklist, citing activities contrary to U.S. national security interests. The Biden administration also issued an executive order prohibiting federal agencies from using spyware linked to human rights abuses. The Justice Department reportedly launched a criminal investigation into NSO Group’s activities. These measures reflect the severity of the threat Pegasus poses and the necessity of addressing it with appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.
The Israeli company NSO Group and its Pegasus spyware posed a significant threat to U.S. national security, global privacy, and human rights. Pegasus is a sophisticated surveillance tool that can infiltrate smartphones without the target’s knowledge, granting operators access to messages, emails, call logs, GPS locations, and the ability to activate microphones and cameras remotely. Though NSO Group claims Pegasus was intended for counterterrorism, evidence shows widespread misuse against journalists, activists, dissidents, and government officials. Notably, Pegasus spyware targeted U.S. diplomats and State Department officials, compromising sensitive communications and threatening national security.
General Michael Flynn’s association with OSY Technologies, a subsidiary of the NSO Group, illustrates the dangers of such relationships, even when individuals have a history of loyal service. Flynn’s role as a consultant highlighted how private military and intelligence firms can blur the lines between national interest and private profit. However, this issue extends beyond Flynn. Figures within the current administration, such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, have ties to entities developing counterparts to Pegasus spyware. Their connections to firms specializing in surveillance technologies underscore the bipartisan nature of this risk.
Regardless of personal integrity or intent, the opportunity for exploitation and conflicts of interest must be eliminated. These relationships threaten to erode national security by making American intelligence and military methods vulnerable to misuse. Whether it is Flynn, Blinken, or Haines, leveraging government-acquired knowledge to support private surveillance companies must be curtailed. The nation’s strategic integrity and sovereignty depend on preventing the commercialization and misuse of these powerful tools.
The Pegasus controversy underscores the urgent need for stricter regulation of the global surveillance technology industry. It highlights the delicate balance between national security, privacy, and human rights while revealing cyber espionage’s potential to strain diplomatic relations. As this situation evolves, governments and international bodies must work to establish effective oversight mechanisms to prevent such technologies from being misused. The risks of these tools falling into the wrong hands are too great to ignore, and protecting sensitive information and communications is critical to maintaining national security and global stability.
I mention this because the amendment also addresses the creation of military-corporate (MC) complexes, where profit motives could erode national loyalty. The nation invests in training its soldiers; that investment should not become a vulnerability exploited by those seeking to harm American interests, even when partnering with “allies.”
Every ally is only one incident away from being an adversary.
~ToreMaras
Many entities are private contractors and brokers of American military methods, intelligence, and tactical expertise. They trade strategies, data, and talent, providing these resources to foreign entities—allies and potential adversaries. This commodification of national security creates a dangerous precedent, risking American-developed methods being turned against our forces or leveraged by nations with conflicting interests.
The NDAA’s expansion of Article 103b to include providing military education, training, and tactical advice as “aiding the enemy” is necessary to curb this trend. Loyalty to the nation must not be for sale, and the integrity of our intelligence and defense methods must remain inviolable. When former high-ranking officials and operatives establish private firms that capitalize on state-acquired knowledge, they create parallel military-industrial complexes operating with minimal oversight. These entities undermine national security and erode public trust in protective institutions.
By tightening these regulations, the government can prevent the exodus of its best talent into global intelligence markets where American strategies become tradable commodities. This ensures that our methods, intelligence, and loyalty remain safeguarded. Maintaining the sanctity of expertise developed within military and intelligence communities is imperative, using it to defend the nation rather than exploit its vulnerabilities. The NDAA’s amendment is not merely a policy change; it reaffirms the values of duty, honor, and service underpinning the American defense establishment. However, it could be BETTER and STRONGER, and I suggest this is done.
It’s a step in the right direction BUT….
I firmly believe that all foreign entities should be barred from accessing U.S. military and intelligence information, methods, and expertise. The knowledge developed within our defense and intelligence communities is a strategic national asset cultivated through decades of sacrifice, investment, and service. Allowing private military and intelligence companies to export these skills—through training, consulting, or direct operational support—to foreign governments, allies, or adversaries risks compromising national security.
This protection must extend beyond the military to include the Intelligence Community (IC) and private companies that perform duties or provide services outside the United States. Many of these firms, often led by former generals, admirals, or senior intelligence officers, operate in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, offering their expertise to foreign governments or non-state actors. While these companies may initially serve U.S. interests, their dual commitments and profit motives create a dangerous conflict of interest. They effectively become brokers of American tactical knowledge—expertise that can be repurposed to serve interests counter to our own.
By restricting the export of this sensitive expertise to foreign entities, including private defense contractors and global intelligence firms, we safeguard the integrity of our methods, protect our personnel, and preserve our strategic dominance. The proposed amendments to Article 103b of the UCMJ are a step in the right direction, ensuring that the sale or transfer of military and intelligence know-how to foreign powers is treated with the gravity it deserves. Loyalty, security, and ethical responsibility must outweigh profit, and our national secrets should remain solely in the hands of those sworn to defend the United States.
In September 2017, then-Minnesota State Representative Ilhan Omar held a private meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in New York City. This encounter, which occurred during Erdoğan’s visit to the United Nations General Assembly, has raised questions about the appropriateness of such engagements by U.S. legislators. Notably, the meeting happened in the same hotel room where Erdoğan met with leaders of U.S. Muslim Brotherhood -affiliated organizations, suggesting potential overlaps in agendas.
This incident underscores the need for clear guidelines and oversight concerning interactions between current and former U.S. officials and foreign entities. To safeguard national interests and prevent conflicts of interest, Congress and Senate members must be included in regulations restricting the dissemination of sensitive information and expertise to foreign governments or organizations. Implementing such measures would help maintain the integrity of U.S. foreign policy and ensure that all governmental actions align with national security objectives.
Protecting Vulnerable Populations: The Amendment to Article 120b
Equally critical is the amendment to Article 120b, which targets a loophole allowing marriage to serve as a defense against charges of sexual abuse of a child. Under current law, if an adult accused of child sexual abuse could prove they were legally married to the minor, that marriage could serve as a defense. This outdated provision fails to protect minors and undermines societal values that prioritize child welfare.
This amendment removes marriage as a valid defense in cases of child sexual abuse. Regardless of legal marital status, engaging in sexual acts with minors is now unequivocally recognized as a crime. This change reflects a broader societal commitment to protecting children from exploitation, especially within contexts where marital relationships can legally mask power imbalances.
Imagine a situation where a minor is coerced into marriage only to suffer abuse under the guise of legal legitimacy. Allowing marriage as a defense perpetuates this exploitation, enabling predators to evade accountability. The law sends a clear message by closing this loophole: children are entitled to protection, regardless of circumstances.
A legal document cannot justify abuse.
~Tore Maras (2010 Torture Briefings)
You might wonder why an amendment like this is even necessary—after all, who would think marriage could justify the sexual abuse of a minor? Believe it or not, this loophole was codified in military law. Under Article 120b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), an accused could claim marriage to a minor as a defense against charges of sexual abuse. This meant that as long as a marital relationship could be proven, the accused could potentially escape accountability for what would otherwise be a clear act of exploitation. It sounds archaic and unfathomable, but it was a legal reality—one that left minors vulnerable to abuse and allowed perpetrators a dangerous loophole. The new amendment seeks to correct this by eliminating marriage as a defense, ensuring that no legal relationship can shield someone from the consequences of exploiting a child.
This amendment aligns the UCMJ with contemporary moral and legal standards. It ensures that our legal system cannot be manipulated to excuse predatory behavior. The protection of minors is non-negotiable, and outdated legal defenses must not compromise justice.
A Unified Commitment to Security and Justice
These amendments in the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 reinforce essential service, responsibility, and protection principles. They reflect a commitment to safeguarding the nation from betrayal and protecting the vulnerable from exploitation.
Expanding the definition of aiding the enemy ensures that military knowledge remains a national asset, not a tool for adversaries. Removing marriage as a defense for child sexual abuse guarantees that minors receive the full protection of the law. Both changes affirm that those entrusted with power, knowledge, and responsibility must be held to the highest standards.
In a world of evolving threats and ethical challenges, these amendments are not just updates to the law but affirmations of what it means to serve, protect, and uphold justice. When betrayal is punished, and innocence is defended, the nation stands stronger, more secure, and more just.
I am still going through the bill and report on anything else I find of significance.
BONUS SEGMENT
The competition between Paragon Solutions and NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware introduces critical questions about the efficacy and strategic consequences of favoring one cyber-intelligence tool over another. The Biden administration’s decision to restrict NSO Group by blacklisting it, while Paragon reportedly continued to operate and grow, may have inadvertently weakened Israeli intelligence capabilities ahead of the October 7th Hamas attacks.
This raises a troubling scenario: What if Hamas utilized Paragon’s spyware or tools similar to it, while Israel’s intelligence relied on Pegasus, which sanctions or restrictions may have hampered? If Paragon was given precedence and allowed to thrive while Pegasus was sidelined, critical gaps in intelligence could have emerged. These gaps might have allowed Hamas to maintain operational secrecy and bypass Israeli surveillance capabilities.
The question of whether this was deliberate or accidental is critical. If the shift towards supporting Paragon over Pegasus was a matter of policy oversight, the resulting vulnerability may have been an unintended consequence. However, if this preference was an intentional decision—perhaps to curb Israeli surveillance power or due to geopolitical motivations—it suggests a dangerous gamble with national security outcomes.
In either case, Hamas’s potential exploitation of these circumstances underscores the perils of allowing market competition and policy decisions to dictate the strength and reach of critical intelligence operations. The consequences of such choices are not limited to commercial rivalry; they can shape the security landscape of nations and the outcomes of conflicts, sometimes with devastating effects.
This suggests that Hamas may indirectly benefit from U.S. taxpayer funds through various channels, including contracted work and other avenues. In my next post, I will explore evidence regarding the alleged funding of Hamas facilitated by a State Department official operating in an official capacity in Gaza.
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