Trump administration systematically suffocated Maduro’s regime through economic and financial warfare; Power worked to provide backdoor relief under the banner of humanitarian aid, in effect, nullifying the very pressure designed to force a collapse of the dictatorship.
The deportation of Venezuelan migrants back to their home country marks a decisive shift in U.S.-Venezuela relations. For years, Washington treated Nicolás Maduro’s regime as an adversary, enforcing crippling sanctions and working to isolate the Venezuelan government both economically and politically. That Maduro is now cooperating with the United States on immigration policy is a significant departure from his previous stance and suggests a recalibration of Venezuela’s geopolitical position. This shift is not happening in isolation but reflects broader strategic calculations on both sides.
Under the Trump administration, backchannel diplomacy became a critical tool in dealing with hostile foreign governments. Ric Grenell, who served as Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, played a pivotal role in negotiating the release of American hostages from Venezuela. His diplomatic approach bypassed conventional channels, relying on economic incentives and discreet leverage. Grenell’s success in extracting concessions from Maduro underscores the effectiveness of intelligence-driven diplomacy, where pressure is applied behind the scenes. At the same time, key figures are offered tangible incentives to shift their positions.
Maduro’s willingness to cooperate with Washington suggests growing economic and political necessity. The Biden administration has lifted certain sanctions, allowing Chevron to resume limited oil extraction operations within Venezuela. This measured rollback of restrictions allows Maduro to generate much-needed revenue while offering the U.S. an avenue for engagement. Venezuela’s economy remains fragile despite recent stabilization, and the regime’s survival hinges on securing foreign capital. Traditional allies such as China have proven unreliable in this regard, with Beijing significantly reducing its financial commitments after years of defaults and mismanagement by Caracas. Unlike previous decades, China has been effectively blocked from controlling Venezuelan oil, and Russia—despite its symbolic presence—has maintained only a limited strategic footprint.
These conditions create an opening for an unlikely but pragmatic alignment with the United States. Suppose Washington continues to play its cards right. In that case, economic necessity may compel Maduro to shift further toward engagement, positioning Venezuela as a potential long-term partner rather than a perpetual adversary. While Maduro remains an unpredictable actor, his recent willingness to collaborate on deportations suggests that Venezuela’s isolation is no longer a viable strategy. The question is no longer whether he will engage with Washington but how far he is willing to go.
Past Proves the Future
In November 2018, I began educating my audience on the strategic importance of Venezuela and the decisive actions President Trump was taking to reshape its geopolitical trajectory. Now, in 2025, the results of his policies are unmistakable. The aggressive sanctions regime, the financial isolation of the Maduro government, and the systematic dismantling of Venezuela’s access to global markets have fundamentally altered the balance of power. What was once seen as an entrenched adversary, propped up by China and Russia, has been strategically weakened, forcing Beijing to scale back its involvement and leaving Moscow with only a token presence.
Trump’s policies were not just about punishing the Maduro regime—they were about reconfiguring Venezuela’s place in the global energy and geopolitical landscape. By crippling PDVSA, he severed Venezuela’s ability to reliably repay its debts to China, making further investment untenable for Beijing. The secondary sanctions on financial institutions created ripple effects that made even the most resilient international backers hesitant to engage. As Venezuela struggles to find new lifelines, the strategic opening left behind is undeniable.
The anger from figures like Samantha Power underscores the success of these efforts. The doctrine of economic pressure, long dismissed by the foreign policy establishment, has proven to be one of the most effective tools in forcing geopolitical realignments. What we are witnessing today is not an accidental shift but the direct consequence of a calculated strategy set in motion years ago—one that is now bearing fruit in ways that even its fiercest critics cannot ignore.
SPOTLIGHT SAMANTHA POWER AND “USAID EXPERTS”
Samantha Power, renowned for advocating humanitarian intervention, has faced criticism for actions perceived as counter to American interests. As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the Obama administration, Power supported military interventions in Libya, Syria, and Yemen on humanitarian grounds that were not humanitarian. These interventions led to increased loss of life, exacerbated refugee crises, and furthered extremism, thereby undermining U.S. strategic interests.
In the context of Venezuela, Power’s 2013 Senate testimony, where she pledged to confront a “crackdown on civil society” in countries including Venezuela, led to diplomatic tensions. Her remarks prompted Venezuela to halt a thaw in relations with the U.S., complicating diplomatic efforts and potentially hindering American interests in the region.
Furthermore, from 2021 to 2025, during her tenure as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Power faced scrutiny over the agency’s operations. Analysts have accused her of operating beyond her mandate, with some suggesting she acted “like a rogue intel chief,” potentially diverting USAID from its primary development objectives and affecting U.S. foreign policy outcomes.
Samantha Power: The Unelected President of Latin America and a Threat to U.S. Sovereignty
Samantha Power has long carried herself as if she were the unelected president of Latin America, wielding U.S. taxpayer dollars through USAID as a personal slush fund to advance her ideological vision rather than American interests. From her time as U.N. Ambassador under Obama to her tenure at USAID, she has operated as if she had the authority to dictate the political fate of sovereign nations across the Western Hemisphere. Whether undermining U.S. sanctions by directing aid to regimes hostile to American security or selectively funding opposition groups based on ideological alignment rather than strategic benefit, Power has consistently positioned herself above the constitutional constraints of her actual role. Her actions in Venezuela are particularly revealing—while the Trump administration systematically suffocated Maduro’s regime through economic and financial warfare, Power worked to provide backdoor relief under the banner of humanitarian aid, in effect, nullifying the very pressure designed to force a collapse of the dictatorship. Her rogue behavior is not just reckless; it is a betrayal of national security interests and facilitated CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN AND HUMANITY.
Power’s USAID tenure has veered beyond its intended mandate, and she has operated more like a shadow intelligence director than a development official. Her selective funding of political movements, facilitation of resources that indirectly benefited adversarial regimes, and continued defiance of policies enacted by the duly elected president all raise the question: Who was she genuinely serving? Congress must act decisively—not just to investigate but to remove her from any position of influence. Providing aid and comfort to adversaries of the United States meets the very definition of treason, and her continued operation as an unelected policymaker with unchecked power is a direct threat to national sovereignty.
The American people did not elect Samantha Power, nor did they authorize her to conduct a parallel foreign policy that runs counter to the nation’s interests. It is time for Congress to restore constitutional order by holding her accountable for the damage she has inflicted.
It’s essential to PAUSE
For a decade, I have laid out the reality of USAID’s operations, tracing the quiet but deliberate financial networks that have funneled billions through Latin America under the guise of humanitarian assistance. I have exposed how this money was never aided by a carefully structured mechanism of influence that operated outside conventional oversight and, in many cases, directly counter American interests. While many dismissed these concerns, preferring to accept surface-level narratives, the truth has become unavoidable. Suddenly, those who never questioned the system and never dug deeper now posture as experts, claiming to have uncovered what has long been in plain sight—if only they had been willing to look.
One of the most glaring omissions in mainstream discourse until now has been the unchecked role of Samantha Power, who ran USAID as though she were the unappointed head of state for Central and South America. I have pointed to this for years—highlighting her role in facilitating aid and moving money in ways that shifted political dynamics, influenced policy outside of democratic processes, and, in many instances, neutralized the very sanctions meant to apply pressure on regimes like Maduro’s. Yet, for all the newfound attention on USAID’s financial trails, one must ask: Why was Power’s influence ignored for so long? Why did those now scrambling to control the narrative fail to see what was evident to anyone genuinely paying attention? The answer is simple: they weren’t reading, they weren’t looking, and they certainly weren’t asking the right questions.
The pattern is familiar. First, those who speak out early are dismissed, ignored, or mocked; President Trump has been vindicated once again with Venezuela. Then, once the weight of evidence becomes too great to deny, the same silent individuals—or worse, complicit—rush to present the revelations as their own. But the facts remain unchanged, and the record is clear. I have outlined these connections long before it became convenient, long before self-anointed experts decided to weigh in (have you looked into WHO they were before they postured as experts?). The real question is not why these facts are emerging now but why those who claim to be leading the conversation failed to recognize them for so long.
No one is mentioning Samantha’s role in all this, which is nothing less than treason. WHY? Maybe they will start now to maintain the illusion.
Remember, this is a show, and you are told who the lead actors are. You can denounce that and move from spectator to participant at any time. ~Tore Maras
Venezuela’s Untapped Power: The World’s Largest Oil Reserves and the Struggle for Control
Venezuela sits atop the largest proven oil reserves on the planet—over 300 billion barrels, immensely more than even Saudi Arabia. At current extraction rates, its reserves could sustain global demand for more than three centuries, a staggering figure that should have made the country an economic powerhouse, a key player in global energy markets, and an indispensable partner to the world’s leading economies. Instead, Venezuela remains a nation in crisis, its vast energy wealth squandered by internal mismanagement, geopolitical isolation, and the technical challenges of its resource base.
Unlike Saudi Arabia, which leveraged its oil wealth to build a robust, state-backed energy empire and establish itself as a linchpin in global markets, Venezuela’s oil sector has been systematically looted. Under Hugo Chávez and later Nicolás Maduro, PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, became a financial black hole. Billions of dollars disappeared through corruption, foreign investments evaporated, and the infrastructure that should have secured Venezuela’s energy dominance fell into disrepair. (USAID) Geopolitical pressures compounded this internal rot as U.S. sanctions cut Venezuela off from the global financial system, severing access to crucial capital, technology, and markets. Without international investment, even the most resource-rich nation is paralyzed, and Venezuela became an economic cautionary tale rather than an oil superpower.
Beyond corruption and sanctions, the very nature of Venezuela’s oil has played a role in its stagnation. Unlike the light, easily refinable crude found in the Middle East, Venezuelan oil is extra-heavy, requiring extensive and costly refining that few global facilities can handle. Without specialized infrastructure and the foreign partnerships needed to process and transport this crude efficiently, Venezuela’s oil industry has remained crippled. The sheer volume of reserves remains undeniable, but without the right political and economic conditions, they are little more than untapped potential. The country could have been the next Saudi Arabia. Still, instead, it has spent decades as a warning of what happens when vast wealth is mismanaged, geopolitics takes precedence over pragmatism, and a nation isolates itself from the very markets that sustain its economy.
Geopolitical Players in Venezuela
Venezuela is more than just another oil-rich state caught in the web of resource politics—it is a battleground for influence among the world’s superpowers, each vying for a foothold in a nation that has held the key to energy security for decades. Unlike the Middle East, where entrenched alliances and long-term investments define the oil trade, or Africa, where China has quietly secured control over vast resource networks, Venezuela remains an open question. No single power has managed to dominate its oil industry fully, and the struggle for control continues to evolve.
Russia, despite its historical support for the Maduro regime, has maintained only a mild presence, far from the strategic grip it enjoys in Syria or even Libya. Rosneft, Moscow’s state-owned oil giant, attempted to gain a foothold, but its investments were never substantial enough to dictate terms in Caracas. When the war in Ukraine reshaped Russia’s priorities, Venezuela quickly became an afterthought. A security arrangement remains—mercenaries, limited military training, and intelligence cooperation—but no genuine economic control. Venezuela is valuable to Russia as an irritant to the United States but not a core asset. Unlike in Syria, where Russian intervention reshaped the course of the civil war, or in Africa, where Wagner Group forces have secured mining concessions in exchange for regime protection, Moscow’s influence in Venezuela remains largely symbolic.
Once seen as Venezuela’s financial lifeline, China has steadily distanced itself from Maduro’s government. Beijing poured over $60 billion into oil-backed loans, expecting a stable partnership, but rampant mismanagement and outright defaults shattered that illusion. Unlike in Africa, where China has executed a slow but methodical takeover of mineral and energy assets through its Belt and Road Initiative, Venezuela has proven too unstable and unreliable. Maduro’s government squandered China’s investments, and Beijing quietly walked away, shifting its attention to African and Middle Eastern nations where it could extract resources without the same level of political chaos. Venezuela, once a centerpiece of China’s Latin American strategy, is no longer a priority.
Beijing Backs Out
Venezuela was once a critical pillar in China’s Latin American expansion, a key recipient of Beijing’s strategic investments, and a major supplier in China’s long-term plan to secure energy independence. The relationship was built on what seemed, at the time, to be a mutually beneficial arrangement: China would provide billions in financing to a regime desperate for economic relief, and in return, Venezuela would guarantee access to the world’s largest oil reserves, repaying its debts in crude shipments rather than cash. Yet, despite years of Chinese loans, infrastructure projects, and diplomatic overtures, Venezuela has steadily fallen off Beijing’s priority list. The question is not simply why China is reducing its footprint in Venezuela but rather why it ever expected success there in the first place.
China’s approach to securing foreign resources has always been distinct from that of the United States or Europe. Rather than relying on military intervention or overt political coercion, Beijing has mastered the art of economic entrenchment. In Africa, this has meant financing large-scale infrastructure projects—ports, railways, highways—that serve dual purposes: providing a veneer of development while ensuring long-term financial dependencies that lock nations into China’s economic orbit. In the Middle East, it has translated into deepening energy partnerships. China has aggressively positioned itself as a primary buyer of Saudi, Iranian, and Emirati oil, cementing its role as a critical partner without direct political intervention. Latin America, however, has proven to be a more volatile landscape, and Venezuela, in particular, has exposed the limits of China’s resource-driven foreign policy.
China’s retreat from Venezuela is neither ideological nor a sign of disengagement from Latin America. Instead, it is a calculated move based on the realization that Venezuela has become a financial sinkhole with no clear path to stability. The country’s oil infrastructure collapse made it nearly impossible for China to extract the expected returns from its investments. Unlike in Africa, where Beijing can afford to play the long game with governments that, despite corruption, still function in some capacity, Venezuela represents a different kind of risk—one that has proven too chaotic even for China’s high-risk, high-reward strategy.
The energy dimension is central to this shift. China’s primary interest in Venezuela was never political alignment; it was access to oil. Yet Venezuela’s crude is among the most difficult in the world to refine, requiring specialized processing capabilities that are not widely available. Unlike the light, high-quality crude China can easily import from the Persian Gulf, Venezuelan oil is extra-heavy and tar-like, requiring extensive upgrading before it can be used. Initially, this posed logistical and economic challenges, but the situation worsened as Venezuela’s oil sector deteriorated under mismanagement and sanctions. The collapse of PDVSA (thanks to President Trump’s first administration) left China dealing with a producer that could no longer reliably meet its commitments. At the same time, U.S. sanctions made it increasingly difficult to transport Venezuelan crude through global markets. Beijing, always pragmatic, saw the warning signs and adjusted accordingly.
China’s broader energy strategy has also evolved beyond Venezuelan oil’s technical and financial burdens. In recent years, Beijing has aggressively diversified its energy supply, deepening ties with Middle Eastern producers while investing long-term in African oilfields and alternative energy sources. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have proven far more reliable partners, offering high-quality crude without Venezuela’s political instability and logistical headaches. China’s strategic shift toward the Gulf states has rendered Venezuela increasingly irrelevant to its energy calculus. At the same time, China has expanded its influence in countries like Angola and Nigeria, where oil production, though politically complex, does not suffer from the extreme dysfunction of Venezuela’s energy sector.
There is also the question of debt. China has loaned Venezuela more than $60 billion, much of it in oil-backed agreements that were supposed to provide Beijing with a steady return on investment. Instead, Venezuela defaulted on multiple payments, and the crude shipments promised as repayment became unreliable due to falling production and U.S. sanctions. While China has historically been willing to tolerate financial risk in exchange for geopolitical leverage, Venezuela tested the limits of this strategy. The Venezuelan government’s inability to maintain even the most basic production levels meant that China was pouring money into a country that could not guarantee a return. Unlike in Africa, where Beijing has built infrastructure that ensures long-term economic control even if short-term returns are delayed, Venezuela presented no such opportunity. The economic chaos and collapse of the state apparatus made it nearly impossible for China to enforce its financial agreements, forcing it to cut its losses.
China’s gradual disengagement from Venezuela reflects a strategic shift in its global priorities. As tensions with the United States escalate, Beijing has focused its economic and diplomatic capital on regions where it can achieve long-term dominance rather than short-term instability. While necessary to China’s global vision, Latin America does not carry the same weight as Africa or the Middle East, where Beijing lays the foundations for decades of resource control. The Belt and Road Initiative has transformed China’s influence in Africa and parts of Asia. Still, it has not translated as effectively to Latin America, where entrenched U.S. influence and political volatility have made long-term control more difficult.
Once seen as a potential cornerstone of China’s Latin American strategy, Venezuela has instead become an example of the risks of investing in a failing state. The infrastructure projects Beijing funded have yielded little, the oil-for-loans model has collapsed under the weight of mismanagement, and the geopolitical value of maintaining a close alliance with Maduro has diminished. China has not abandoned Venezuela outright but deprioritized it, shifting its focus to more stable and lucrative energy partners.
Vacuum by President Trump’s Design
China’s retreat from Venezuela is partly the result of deliberate U.S. strategy rather than just Beijing’s recalculations. The United States has long relied on economic and financial pressure as geopolitical maneuvering, particularly when controlling resource-rich nations and limiting the reach of adversarial powers. China has reduced its engagement with Venezuela. It is not solely because of the inherent instability of the country but also because Washington has made it too costly and inconvenient for Beijing to maintain its grip. This form of indirect containment does not rely on confrontation but instead exploits the vulnerabilities in China’s global expansion strategy. Reminds me of Alcibiades and his Sicilian expansion.
The U.S. has employed economic warfare as a tool of influence for decades, using sanctions, financial restrictions, and trade policies to shape the behavior of both allies and rivals. The case of Venezuela is no different. Through a combination of sanctions on PDVSA, restrictions on financial transactions involving Venezuelan oil, and diplomatic efforts to isolate Caracas from global markets, the U.S. has created conditions where China’s investment in Venezuela is no longer a winning strategy. Unlike in Africa, where Beijing has secured its influence through long-term infrastructure control, China’s model in Venezuela relied on steady oil payments and economic stability, which the U.S. has systematically disrupted.
This strategy is not new. Washington has used similar tactics to undermine foreign influence in key resource-heavy regions. By crippling the Venezuelan economy through sanctions and cutting off its access to global financial networks, the U.S. effectively forced China into a position where continued investment became a liability rather than an asset.
President Trump’s Actions During First Term Delivered Results
The extensive sanctions imposed by the Trump administration during its first term significantly contributed to China’s decision to scale back its involvement in Venezuela. These sanctions targeted Venezuela’s vital oil industry, financial institutions, and key government officials, creating a challenging environment for foreign investors, including China.
In August 2017, the Trump administration prohibited Venezuela’s access to U.S. financial markets, restricting the government’s ability to raise capital and service debt. This move deterred foreign entities from engaging in monetary transactions with Venezuela due to the heightened risk of secondary sanctions.
Further intensifying the pressure, in January 2019, the U.S. sanctioned Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil company. These sanctions froze PDVSA’s assets within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the company. Since oil exports are the cornerstone of Venezuela’s economy, these measures severely restricted the country’s primary revenue stream.
China, which had extended over $60 billion in loans to Venezuela, primarily to be repaid through oil deliveries, found itself in a precarious position. The sanctions complicated the logistics of oil shipments and increased the financial and reputational risks associated with continued involvement in Venezuela. Consequently, Beijing reassessed its strategy, opting to minimize its exposure to the increasingly unstable Venezuelan environment.
There is also a strategic element to China’s inability to extract value from Venezuela’s oil reserves. Much of China’s global expansion depends on its ability to secure energy resources outside U.S. control. China has worked around U.S. sanctions in places like Iran by structuring payments and shipments through backdoor financial networks. However, despite its vast oil reserves, Venezuela has proven a more difficult challenge. The U.S. has sanctioned the oil industry and leveraged its naval power in the Caribbean to monitor and intercept unauthorized oil shipments. This has made it significantly harder for China to extract its promised oil shipments, further increasing the risks of remaining engaged.
In summary, President Trump’s first administration’s sanctions were instrumental in creating conditions that led China to reduce its engagement with Venezuela. By targeting the economic lifelines that sustained Venezuela’s alliances, the U.S. effectively curtailed the support that countries like China were willing to provide to Nicolás Maduro’s regime. Therefore, Beijing has left a vacuum that the United States will fill strategically.
But is China growing energy ties with the Gulf states?
If Washington understood that China was already shifting toward Saudi and Emirati oil, forcing Beijing out of Venezuela would have been a calculated decision rather than an incidental outcome. The more China depends on Gulf oil, the more leverage the U.S. retains over Beijing’s energy security. While China has worked to diversify its oil imports, it has not yet found a perfect alternative to Middle Eastern suppliers. The United States may have recognized this and used Venezuela as a pressure point to keep China from developing an independent Western Hemisphere energy foothold.
A final consideration is whether U.S. intelligence played a role in directly influencing China’s disengagement. It would not be the first time. During the Cold War, the U.S. routinely engaged in economic disruption strategies to deny the Soviet Union access to key resources. More recently, Washington has employed economic and intelligence warfare against China’s Belt and Road Initiative, exposing corruption, pressuring recipient countries to cancel deals, and making Chinese investments look riskier. In Venezuela, there is no doubt that U.S. agencies have been monitoring Chinese activities closely, potentially feeding intelligence to allies and financial institutions that would make further engagement even less appealing for Beijing.
If China’s withdrawal from Venezuela was not entirely by the United States’ design, then Washington has undoubtedly exploited it to its advantage. Whether through direct influence, economic warfare, or simply a long-term containment strategy, the U.S. has ensured that Venezuela never became a secure energy hub for China. With China deprioritizing its Venezuelan investments, the United States has a rare opportunity to enter the vacuum.
New Borders and New Alliances
Venezuela’s shifting relationship with the United States is a textbook example of how realpolitik trumps ideology when survival is at stake. Once firmly entrenched as an anti-American outpost, Caracas is slowly creeping toward a more pragmatic stance—because it has no other choice. History has seen this before: Vietnam, once a bitter enemy, is now a U.S. economic partner. Once an isolated monarchy, Saudi Arabia became a critical U.S. energy ally. Even China, a sworn enemy of American capitalism, shook hands with Nixon when it suited its long-term interests. Venezuela is following the same script.
The reality is that economic necessity has a way of overriding ideological posturing. Despite years of railing against U.S. imperialism, Maduro now dances on TikTok, trying to soften his image and appear palatable enough to attract foreign investment. Chávez would have never debased himself like this. Still, Chávez also didn’t run his country into the kind of economic ruin that forces even the most committed autocrats to seek lifelines from former enemies. Maduro allowing U.S. deportations of Venezuelan migrants—a move unthinkable under Chávez—is another indicator that the regime is shifting from defiance to quiet negotiation.
The oil tells the real story. Chevron remains one of the last major foreign oil companies still operating in Venezuela, and the Biden administration’s decision to allow its continued presence means one thing: Venezuelan crude is too important to be left off the market. Washington is already reconsidering its posture because the alternative—Venezuela slipping deeper into China’s or Russia’s orbit—was never an actual solution. And speaking of China, let’s recap how they are losing influence here.
Once Venezuela’s most enthusiastic creditor, China has effectively cut its losses and disappeared. Venezuela was a lousy bet. Unlike in Africa or the Middle East, where China’s investments are carefully structured to ensure control, Venezuela’s instability made it an unreliable partner. Xi Jinping has better energy deals elsewhere. Russia, too, has seen its influence shrink. Moscow’s support was not about building Venezuela into a strong ally but about keeping the U.S. annoyed. After the Ukraine invasion, Putin had more significant problems to deal with, and Rosneft quietly pulled out in 2020, further signaling that Russia never saw Venezuela as a serious strategic asset. Iran, while still offering some technical assistance in refining oil, is in no position to bankroll Venezuela the way China once did.
This creates a vacuum the U.S. can fill—if it plays its cards right. Sanctions relief, carefully structured economic incentives, and slow but steady reintegration into the global financial system could pull Venezuela further away from its former patrons. The country has oil but needs refining expertise, investment, and markets to sell it to. The U.S. has all three. If Washington wants to cut China out of Venezuela permanently, this is the time to do it.
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves—Maduro isn’t about to become America’s new best friend. He’s still an opportunist and will hedge his bets until the very last moment. What he won’t do is continue down the same path of isolation, economic decay, and failed alliances. The question isn’t if Venezuela moves closer to the U.S.; it’s how long it takes and whether Washington will act fast enough to shape the terms of that shift. If history is any indicator, the answer is obvious: when a country is faced with staying isolated, broke, or getting back into the game, pragmatism always wins.
ENERGY IS KEY in GLOBAL MOVES.
Energy isn’t just a resource—it’s the currency of power. Control the flow, and you control the game.” – Tore Maras
Remember, Everything Is Evident
Trump Administration’s Role & Ric Grenell’s Diplomatic Play
Ric Grenell, Trump’s former Director of National Intelligence, has a reputation for high-stakes diplomatic backchanneling. He was involved in the successful negotiation for the release of American hostages from Venezuela. This covert deal bypassed traditional diplomatic channels, leveraging economic incentives and personal diplomacy. Grenell’s approach offered Maduro something tangible while applying pressure behind the scenes—a strategy often used by intelligence operatives rather than diplomats. Former ODNI and Diplomat Ric Grenell and his famous satchel were the only men who could do it and get the discussions going. It’s a pretty big win that cannot be overstated – now Samantha Power is coming into focus.
THIS ARTICLE is drawn from the upcoming book of my series: Digital Dominion | Energy The Currency of Power, Volume IV Chapter 3: VENEZUELA
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