Every previous installment of this series concerned the dead, or the bodies that the living would become. This one is different, and the difference is the entire point. The people in this installment are alive. They can be found. They can be returned to their families and their freedom. The consent vacuum that the architecture has, until now, operated on corpses, it operates here on breathing human beings whose legal right to refuse has been signed over to a guardian, a hospital, or an institution — and who, unlike the dead, are still waiting for someone with authority to notice. A legislator reading this can do something the families in the first four parts can no longer do: intervene before the harm is finished.
SECTION ONEThe Living Vacuum
The architecture this series has documented across four installments has a single mechanical requirement: the legal authority to consent on a person's behalf must be transferred from the person, or their family, to an institution whose financial incentives run parallel to a specific extraction. For the prisoners of Part I, the foster children of Part II, the unclaimed dead of Part III, and the detained migrants of Part IV, that transfer occurred at or after death, or after the person had been removed from their family's reach. The body could not object. The family could not be found in time.
For the living, the transfer is performed by a legal instrument: a guardianship order, a conservatorship, an involuntary-commitment hold, or a finding of decisional incapacity that authorizes a "legally authorized representative" to consent in the person's place. The instrument is, like the doctrine of parens patriae examined in Part II, genuinely necessary in its proper application. People do lose the capacity to manage their affairs — through dementia, severe disability, acute psychiatric crisis, traumatic injury. Someone must be empowered to act for them. The instrument exists for good reasons.
But the instrument does the same thing the death certificate did in the earlier parts: it removes the person's signature from the consent line and replaces it with someone else's. And once that substitution is made, the same architecture becomes available — with one critical difference. The extraction here is not of organs or tissue after death. It is of liberty, of assets, of bodily autonomy, and of the revenue that a living body generates as long as it can be billed. The living patient is worth more than the dead one, because the living patient can be billed every day.
This installment documents three systems in which the consent vacuum operates on the living: the guardianship and conservatorship system, the for-profit psychiatric-commitment system, and the framework governing medical research on people who cannot consent. In each, the same finding recurs — the one that has anchored every part of this series. The system is structured so that no one is reliably counting, the families are structured out of the decision, and the institution that holds the person also controls the record of what is done to them.
SECTION TWOThe Guardianship Machine
Roughly 1.3 million American adults are living under guardianship or conservatorship. Their guardians control, by the most-cited estimate, approximately $50 billion in assets. Those two numbers come from the National Center for State Courts — and the most important fact about them is that they are estimates, drawn from a handful of states that track the data reasonably, projected across the rest, and more than six years old.
In November 2016, the Government Accountability Office published a report whose title is itself the finding: Elder Abuse: The Extent of Abuse by Guardians Is Unknown. The GAO reported that there is limited data on the number of guardians serving older adults, the number of older adults in guardianships, and the number of cases of elder abuse by a guardian. Court officials in six states told the GAO they could not provide reliable figures. The most common form of abuse the GAO's interviewees observed was financial exploitation. But the headline conclusion was the absence itself: nationally, the extent of the abuse is unknown, because no one is required to count it.
This is the same structural finding as the North Dakota audits in Part II, the missing-foster-children audit in Part II, and the ICE undercount in Part IV. The closing of the record is achieved not by hiding individual cases but by never building the system that would make the pattern visible. Two United States Senators — Bob Casey and Mike Braun, the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging — formally asked the GAO to examine guardianship laws nationwide precisely because, as their letter noted, the status of people under guardianship may be "poorly monitored in sufficient, meaningful, and diligent ways," resulting in "exploitation, abuse, and neglect."
What the Vacuum Permits
The cases that do surface show what the unmonitored authority permits. The Senators' own letter cited New Mexico, where the owners of a guardianship agency embezzled approximately $10 million from their clients and spent it on luxury goods and vacations. It cited Nevada, where adults were placed under guardianship for questionable reasons and then lost their homes, their assets, and contact with their families. The Nevada cases centered on a professional guardian named April Parks, who at one point held authority over roughly 400 wards and was eventually arrested and convicted on charges including racketeering, theft, and exploitation. In one documented instance, Parks filed an emergency ex-parte petition — a procedure that allowed her to obtain guardianship without the family being notified of the hearing — then sold nearly all of an elderly couple's belongings and transferred their savings into an account under her own name.
The ex-parte mechanism is worth pausing on, because it is the consent vacuum in its purest legal form: a court grants a stranger authority over a person's entire life and estate at a hearing the person and their family were never told was happening. By the time the family learns of it, the authority is already granted, and the burden has shifted to them to undo it — a process that is, by every account, prolonged, expensive, and stacked against them, because courts begin from the presumption that the guardianship exists to protect the ward.
The Body, Not Just the Estate
Guardianship authority does not stop at money. It reaches the body. The powers a guardian holds typically include the authority to make medical decisions — and in many states, that authority extends to decisions about reproduction and contraception without a separate court order. When Britney Spears testified in 2021 that she had been prevented from removing an IUD even though she wanted to have more children, the claim sent a shock through the public precisely because most people did not know it was legally possible. It is. In many states a guardian can place a ward on long-term contraception without seeking a court order at all, because the decision falls within the guardian's general authority over medical care. Guardians can also move to have wards sterilized; some states require court approval, and others have no clear law on the question. And because there is no requirement to file such decisions in a trackable way, there is no way to know how often it happens.
That last sentence is the architecture again. The decision about whether a living person can reproduce is made by someone else, requires no notice, generates no record, and is therefore uncountable. The harm is not hidden case by case. The system simply never built the ledger.
SECTION THREEThe Psychiatric Hold
If guardianship is the slow transfer of consent, involuntary psychiatric commitment is the fast one. And in the for-profit psychiatric sector, it has been documented operating exactly as the architecture predicts: as a mechanism for converting a living person into a billable asset, held precisely as long as the billing lasts.
In September 2024, The New York Times published an investigation into Acadia Healthcare, one of the largest chains of for-profit behavioral-health facilities in the United States — at the time, by one accounting, 54 psychiatric hospitals across 19 states. The investigation's finding, drawn from medical records and interviews with patients and current and former employees, was that Acadia had held patients against their will when detaining them was not medically necessary, in order to maximize insurance payouts. The mechanism was the involuntary-commitment law — the same statute, in each state, that exists to protect people who are an imminent danger to themselves or others.
The operative logic was captured in a single sentence attributed to a top Acadia executive in the reporting:
"If there were insurance days left, that patient was going to be held." — Attributed to an Acadia executive, per The New York Times, September 2024
The patient's medical need did not determine the length of the stay. The patient's insurance balance did. Former staff described being instructed to document more severe diagnoses than the patients presented — to make patients appear "sicker than they actually were," to characterize a patient as "combative," to cite a patient's failure to finish a meal as evidence they were unfit for discharge. Each notation extended the billable stay. Acadia reportedly charged as much as $2,200 per day, and the bulk of its revenue came from government insurance — Medicaid and Medicare — meaning the public was financing the detentions.
One Acadia facility — North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital in Florida — filed more than 4,500 petitions with the court to extend patients' involuntary stays. The court granted only 54 of them.
But the granting was almost beside the point. Under the procedure, Acadia could continue to hold the patient — and bill their insurance — for all the days the petition was pending before the court ruled. The 4,500 filings were not a bid to win 4,500 cases. They were a mechanism to generate billable detention days while the court worked through the backlog. The denial rate of 98.8 percent did not protect the patients. The pendency did the work.
Acadia was not alone, and the pattern was not new. In 2020, Universal Health Services — another of the largest for-profit psychiatric chains in the country — agreed to pay $122 million to settle Justice Department allegations that included billing for medically unnecessary inpatient admissions and failing to discharge patients when they no longer required inpatient care. The 2024 Acadia reporting and the 2020 UHS settlement bracket a documented, adjudicated, and settled pattern within the for-profit psychiatric industry: the involuntary-commitment statute, written to protect people in crisis, repurposed as a billing instrument.
The scale of involuntary commitment generally is itself worth stating, because it defines the size of the population exposed to this mechanism. By estimates cited in the reporting, more than half — roughly 57 percent — of admissions to psychiatric facilities in the United States are involuntary. The population that can be held without its own consent is not a marginal one. It is the majority of everyone admitted.
SECTION FOURThe Research Subject
The third system is the one that connects this installment directly to the historical record laid out in Part II — Fernald, Willowbrook, Incarnation — and to the contemporary tissue economy documented in the market. It is the framework governing medical research on people who cannot consent for themselves.
The federal regulation is 45 C.F.R. Part 46, the Common Rule, with its parallel FDA provisions at 21 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 56. The Common Rule identifies people with impaired decision-making capacity as a population "vulnerable to coercion or undue influence," alongside children, prisoners, and the economically disadvantaged, and directs Institutional Review Boards to be "particularly cognizant" of research involving them. That is the protective half of the framework, and it is real.
The other half is the consent-substitution mechanism. Under the Common Rule, when a prospective research subject lacks the capacity to consent, informed consent may be sought from the subject's "legally authorized representative" — the same legal device, in research form, that the guardianship system produces. And under specified conditions, in research deemed minimal-risk, the regulation permits an IRB to waive the requirement of informed consent altogether, or to permit research to proceed on temporarily incapacitated subjects under a Secretarial waiver. The architecture's signature is visible in the structure itself: the regulation that protects the incapacitated subject also defines the precise legal pathway by which their consent can be supplied by someone else, or dispensed with.
This is not an argument that the regulation is wrong. Research on conditions that cause incapacity — Alzheimer's, schizophrenia, stroke, severe psychiatric illness — cannot advance if the people who have those conditions are categorically excluded, and a blanket ban (such as the one Montenegro enacted in 2013) has its own well-documented harms. The point is narrower and it is the same point this series has made in every part: the safeguard and the vulnerability are built from the same materials. The "legally authorized representative" who can consent to beneficial research on an incapacitated person's behalf is the same instrument that, in the guardianship cases of Section Two, sold an elderly couple's belongings and transferred their savings. The protection and the exposure are the same legal object viewed from two sides.
What makes the research context matter for this series specifically is the demand documented in the market: a price-transparent, under-regulated economy in human tissue and research access. When the supply of consent can be manufactured through a legally authorized representative, and the demand for human research material is as robust as the criminal cases in the market record demonstrate, the only thing standing between the two is the diligence of an Institutional Review Board and the integrity of the representative. Both have failed before. The historical record of Part II is the proof.
SECTION FIVEThe Architecture, Applied
The living populations map onto the same six-step pattern as the dead — with the extraction mode shifted from the body to liberty, assets, and billable time.
| Step | How it operates for the living patient |
|---|---|
| Custody | Guardianship/conservatorship order; involuntary-commitment hold; finding of decisional incapacity. ~1.3M adults under guardianship; ~57% of psychiatric admissions involuntary. |
| Control of notification | Ex-parte petitions grant guardianship without family notice. Psychiatric facilities documented cutting patients off from families. Court hearings the person never knew were scheduled. |
| Consent transfer | Authority moves to a guardian or "legally authorized representative" — over money, medical care, reproduction, and research participation. The person's signature is replaced. |
| Contract / billing routing | Guardian fees and asset control ($50B under management). Psychiatric per-diem billing (up to ~$2,200/day, largely Medicaid/Medicare). Research access via LAR consent. |
| Revenue extraction | Embezzled estates; detention billed until insurance runs out; the living body monetized daily for as long as authority is held. |
| Closing of the record | GAO: "the extent of abuse is unknown." No national guardianship data. Reproductive decisions untracked. Petition pendency, not adjudication, sustains the hold. |
The distinguishing feature of the living populations is the one that should give a policymaker the most urgency: the extraction is ongoing. The dead of Parts I through IV cannot be un-harvested; the record can only be opened after the fact. The 1.3 million adults under guardianship, the majority-involuntary psychiatric population, and the incapacitated research subjects are being acted upon now. The intervention is not retrospective accountability. It is rescue.
SECTION SIXThe Constitutional Throughline
The living patient holds liberty interests that the dead do not, and the constitutional protections are correspondingly stronger — which is what makes the documented failures so striking. The deprivation of physical liberty through civil commitment is governed by O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which the Supreme Court held that a state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom. The standard of proof required to commit was set in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), at "clear and convincing evidence" — a deliberately high bar, because the liberty at stake is so substantial.
The Acadia mechanism documented in Section Three operates in the gap between that constitutional standard and its enforcement. The Constitution requires clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness to confine a person. The reporting describes a system that manufactured the appearance of dangerousness — exaggerated diagnoses, "combative" notations, missed meals recast as symptoms — to satisfy a hold whose actual driver was the insurance balance. The constitutional standard was not repealed. It was routed around, through documentation, in a setting where the patient's ability to contest the record in real time was precisely what the confinement removed.
The guardianship cases implicate the same due-process guarantees. The ex-parte petition — granting authority over a person's liberty and estate without notice to the person or their family — sits in obvious tension with the procedural-due-process requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard before a protected interest is taken. That these petitions are granted routinely, and unwound only rarely and at great cost, is not evidence that the Constitution permits the practice. It is evidence that the constitutional protection has been left, as in every part of this series, to litigants who lack the resources to assert it — here, by definition, people a court has just declared incapable of managing their own affairs.
SECTION SEVENWhat Can Be Done
This is the section that distinguishes Part V from the four before it. The dead cannot be helped by legislation; they can only be counted, belatedly, and mourned. The living can be helped now. The reforms below are not speculative — each responds to a specific, documented gap in this installment, and several are already moving through legislatures. A constituent who wants to act can bring these directly to a state legislator or a member of Congress.
For Federal Legislators
For State Legislators
For Constituents
CLOSINGWhat Remains
The patient is the place in this series where the architecture is still reversible. The prisoner of Part I is dead. The child of Part II, the unclaimed of Part III, the migrant of Part IV — the harm done to them is complete, and the only remaining act is the opening of the record. But the 1.3 million adults under guardianship are alive this morning. The patients held in for-profit psychiatric beds until their insurance runs dry are alive. The incapacitated research subjects are alive. Every one of them can be counted, protected, and in many cases freed — not by a court ruling years from now, but by a statute a legislature could pass this session.
The closing of the record, in the case of the living, is not yet final. It is being written, day by day, in the billing systems and the unmonitored guardianship files and the untracked medical decisions. The same instrument that produces the abuse — the transfer of consent to a representative — is the instrument that, properly bounded, protects the genuinely incapacitated. The work is not to abolish it. The work is to count it, to bound it, to require notice and review and independent representation, and to sever the financial incentive that turns a protective instrument into an extractive one.
None of this is hidden. The GAO said the abuse is unknown and explained exactly why. The Senators asked for the data. The Times documented the billing mechanism. The model statutes are drafted. The constitutional standards — O'Connor, Addington — are settled law. What is missing is not knowledge. What is missing is the decision to count the living before they become the dead of some future installment.
Part VI — The Ancestors — will return to the dead, and to the oldest retained bodies of all: the Indigenous remains held for more than a century in the collections of American universities and museums, and the law that was supposed to bring them home.